

# **Trade and Industry Select Committee**

## **Inquiry into Pubcos**



**CAMPAIGN  
FOR  
REAL ALE**

**A Response from  
CAMRA, The Campaign  
for Real Ale**

**June 2004**

## **1.0 Summary of Recommendations**

- 1.1 The introduction of a guest beer right for all pubco tenants and lessees.
- 1.2 Pubcos should be obliged to offer every prospective tenant the option of a free of tie tenancy at a competitive rent.
- 1.3 The annual increase in pubcos list prices must not exceed whichever is the higher of the annual increase in the producer price index or the RPI.
- 1.4 Annual RPI increases and upward only rent reviews should be stopped.
- 1.5 Tenants should have the right to have disputes settled by the courts, notwithstanding a provision for arbitration.
- 1.6 A legally binding code of conduct setting out the obligations and duties of pubcos to their tenants.
- 1.7 The OFT remains vigilant of pubco mergers and takeovers.

## 2.0 Introduction

2.1 CAMRA welcomes the decision by the committee to investigate the relationship between pubcos and their tenants. As a consumer organisation, with 72,000 members, we are concerned that the anti-competitive practices of pubcos are harming the consumer as a result of:

- Lack of access to beers from small and medium sized brewers.
- Beer price increases at above the rate of inflation.
- Reduced investment in pub estates
- The closure of valued community pubs made unviable by high rents and beer prices.

2.2 We support the retention of the “Tie” but believe that the “Tie” should be loosened. CAMRA supports the tie for the following reasons:

- The tenancy system along with the beer tie allows thousands of entrepreneurs to enter the pub trade at low cost in terms of capital outlay, and low risk.
- The beer tie is essential to the survival of small and medium sized brewers. These brewers currently own 5,800 tenanted public houses<sup>1</sup> and are reliant on these tied outlets to showcase their products and provide access to market.
- Abolition of the “Tie” could have a number of unintended consequences as rents would be forced up to compensate, and pubcos might consider selling their pub estates.

2.3 We recognise that the focus of this enquiry is the relationship between pubcos and their tenants. However, in making recommendations we believe that it is important to consider the impact on the industry as a whole, as a pubco could always alter its commercial strategy to purchase brewing operations, thereby changing the vertical integration of the market distribution model.

2.4 It is our view that a complex monopoly exists in favour of pubcos with tied estates. Pubcos are protected from competition in supplying their tenanted estates as other parties are denied access. Pubcos are thus able to charge a higher margin on their beer sales to tenants than they would in the absence of the “Tie”, which feeds through into higher retail prices, business failures and a lack of investment.

2.5 The practice of deep discounting by the four national UK brewers (Carlsberg UK, Interbrew, Coors and Scottish & Newcastle) ensures that they are able to secure supply agreements with the pubcos. There is thus a clear financial incentive for pub companies to restrict choice to a limited number of national beer brands in order to maximise their margins on beer sold on to their tenants.

---

<sup>1</sup> British Beer and Pub Association – 2003 Statistical handbook (BBPA, London 2003) p.66. Figure from 2002.

### 3.0 Background to the Pub Industry


3.1 The pub industry has undergone huge structural and strategic changes since 1990. CAMRA would summarise these changes as:

- A reduction in the number of pubs owned by brewers from 43,500 in 1990 to 9,800 in 2002.<sup>2</sup>
- An increase in the number of pubs owned by pub companies from 12,700 in 1991 to over 31,500 in 2002.<sup>3</sup>
- Entrance of multinational companies into pub ownership.
- Consolidation of pub ownership among pub companies.

3.2 The big four UK national brewers have maintained their dominance of the market through marketing, discounting, and distribution. This dominance is reinforced through long term heavily discounted supply agreements with the large pubcos. Smaller breweries and small wholesalers who are unable to offer the same level of discount to win national supply accounts, are effectively priced out of competing for business, and denied market access. This in turn denies pubco tenants beers from smaller and medium sized brewers even if their customers demand it.

3.3 It is not unusual for consumer demand in community style pubs (which form the backbone of the large pubco estates) to request beers from local and regional breweries. Tenants require flexibility to be able to meet changes in consumer demand, which increasingly are driven by interest in new and innovative products, including local, regional and heritage products.

**Figure 1 – Pub Ownership in the UK<sup>4</sup>**



<sup>2</sup> BBPA Statistical Handbook 2003. p.66

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.* p.66

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp 66 – 67; and Publican Newspaper Industry Report 2004 (London, January 2004).

<b>Pubco Tenanted</b>	<b>23,800</b>
<b>Pubco Managed</b>	<b>7,700</b>
<b>Brewery Tenanted</b>	<b>5,800</b>
<b>Brewery Managed</b>	<b>4,000</b>
<b>Freehouses</b>	<b>16,850</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>58,150</b>

3.5 Figure 1 shows that Pubcos have significant market power, collectively owning over 50% of the UK's 60,000 pubs. It also shows that 71% of the UK's pubs are restricted in the beers, which they can sell, thus contributing to reduced choice and higher prices for consumers.

#### **Figure 2 – Top Four Pub Companies<sup>5</sup>**

<b>Pubco</b>	<b>Number of Pubs</b>	<b>% of UK Pubs</b>
Enterprise Inns	8,843 (Leasehold and Tenancy)	14.7%
Punch Taverns	7,400 (Leasehold and Tenancy)	12.3%
Spirit Group	2,470 (Managed)	4.1%
Mitchell and Butler	2,077 (Managed)	3.4%
Total	20,790	34.5%

**NB. Acquisition of Unique Pub Co by Enterprise Inns completed April 2004. Enterprise Inns subsequently sold 250 pubs.**

3.6 Figure 2 shows that over a third of UK pubs are in the hands of only four pubcos. The top four pubcos now control over a third of UK pubs, with Enterprise Inns controlling 8,843 alone.

3.7 The acquisition of Unique Pub Co in April 2004 by Enterprise Inns means that two pub companies between them control over one in four UK pubs. The continued consolidation of ownership suggests that the dominance of the pubcos will continue to grow, further undermining competition and consumer choice.

---

<sup>5</sup> Publican Newspaper Industry Report 2004 (London, January 2004).

#### 4.0 Background to the Brewing Industry

4.1 The brewing industry has also undergone huge structural and strategic changes since 1990.

4.2 CAMRA would summarise these changes as:

- Consolidation in brewing meaning fewer brewers with increased market share.
- Increase in discounting by brewers in order to secure market share.
- Success of brand marketing policies in establishing “must stock” brands.
- An increase in the number of small brewers from only 160 in 1989<sup>6</sup> to over 400 today.

**Figure 3 - Top Six Brewers - On Trade Market Share (Volume) 2003<sup>7</sup>**

Company	Market Share
Scottish Courage	26.3%
Coors	20.3%
Interbrew UK	16.4%
Carlsberg – Tetley	13.6%
Diageo	6%
Anheuser - Busch	1.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>84.2%</b>

4.3 The brewing market is becoming evermore concentrated as a result of larger brewers taking over smaller ones. Six national brewers controlled 67% of the market in 1967, and 75% in 1989.<sup>8</sup> Today only four national brewers control over 76% of the market, and as fig. 3 shows the top six control 84.2%.

4.4 The increased concentration of the brewing industry has been the result of takeovers and mergers. In addition the use of discounts by national brewers to secure contracts with the national pub chains has allowed them to expand their market share at the expense of smaller brewers. The concentration of the off trade market reflects that of the on trade, and also severely limits consumer choice.

**Figure 4 – Top Brewers Take Home Market Share (Volume) 2003<sup>9</sup>**

Company	Market Share
Interbrew UK	25.5%
Scottish – Courage	22.6%
Coors	17.2%
Carlsberg – Tetley	10.7%
Anheuser - Busch	4.1%
Diageo	3.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>83.3</b>

<sup>6</sup> MMC Report – The Supply of Beer (London, 1989) p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> AC Nielsen/GB/YE Dec 2003


<sup>8</sup> MMC Report – The Supply of Beer (London, 1989) p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> AC Nielsen/GB/YE Dec 2003

## 5.0 Consumer Choice

- 5.1 The concentration in ownership of breweries and pubs has severely restricted consumer choice. The restriction in choice is to the detriment of small brewers who are denied access to the market and to the consumer who faces a limited beer choice.
- 5.2 The use of the beer tie by pubcos means that tenants are unable to meet the needs of their customers by sourcing a wider range of beers.
- 5.3 The industry often asserts that if choice has diminished then this is because the consumer does not mind. They argue that if the consumer really did care about choice they would choose to drink elsewhere. Unfortunately however, the concentration in ownership of pubs and dominance of pubcos (particularly in the community pub segment of the market) denies consumers this choice, which prevents the normal operation of market forces.
- 5.4 Research quoted by the Competition Commission suggests that the selection of beer or the presence of real beer is an important factor for 20% of consumers in their choice of pub.<sup>10</sup> These 20% are likely to be among the most regular pub goers because of their interest in beer.

**Figure 5 – Agreement with statement that at least one beer sold in every pub should be locally brewed.<sup>11</sup> All adults who visit pubs.**



- 5.5 Research commissioned by CAMRA suggests that there is huge demand for locally produced beers. The beer tie however prevents the vast majority of pubs from selling locally produced beers despite clear consumer demand.

<sup>10</sup> Competition Commission – Interbrew SA and Bass PLC. P.61. NOP/ Mintel Survey, April 2000.

<sup>11</sup> RSGB Omnibus – Beer Omnibus Survey 2 – 6 July 2003. p.69.

- 5.6 The same consumer survey revealed that 23% of all adults who visit pubs would be willing to pay more for locally brewed beer in a pub.<sup>12</sup> 31% of all adults who visit pubs would buy locally brewed beer in a pub over non-locally brewed beer.
- 5.7 The use of the beer tie by pubcos is manifestly failing to meet the demand by consumers for locally produced beer. CAMRA therefore believes that the tie should be loosened to allow flexibility for tenants to source local and regional beers in response to local consumer demand. Successful tenants know their customers' needs and need to have the flexibility to respond to changes in consumer demand. The current situation means that the market is foreclosed to small brewers and that individual pubs are unable to respond to local customer demands.
- 5.8 EU regulations partially justify the existence of the tie on the grounds that the beer tie must be "to the consumers benefit, and not to his detriment". The effect of the pubco "Tie" in restricting consumer choice therefore undermines one of the very reasons for the existence of "Tie".
- 5.9 In order to facilitate consumer choice and to tackle the emergence of anti competitive practices CAMRA makes the following proposals.
- **The introduction of a guest beer right for all pubco tenants and lessees.** This proposal would give 23,800 pubs the right to source one cask-conditioned beer outside of the "Tie". As a result two out of five pubs in Britain would be able to offer consumers greater choice.
  - **Pubcos should be obliged to offer every prospective tenant the option of a free of tie tenancy at a competitive rent.** This proposal would give prospective tenants the freedom to choose whether they wish to sign up to the beer tie or whether they would like a free of tie tenancy. In case of dispute over the setting of the rent for a free of tie lease prospective tenants should be able to have the matter settled by the courts, notwithstanding any provisions for arbitration.
- 5.10 These recommendations would transform the pub industry; increasing consumer choice and competition. 23,800 pubs (39% of UK pubs) would benefit from the option to supply one cask-conditioned beer outside of the "Tie". The benefits of opening up the market in this way would be:
- Improved consumer choice
  - Increased access to the market for small and regional brewers
  - Improved profitability of pubs benefiting pubco and tenant alike
- 5.11.1 We believe that a guest beer right would help improve market access for over 2,000 cask conditioned beers brewed in Britain to which tenants currently only have access to a very few. Tenants would also have access to cask conditioned beers brewed throughout the European Union.

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.81.

## 6.0 Beer Prices

6.1 The retail price of beer has consistently increased at a faster rate than both the rate of inflation and the producer price of beer. We believe that this is indicative of the monopolistic position of the pubcos. Whilst it is clear that the price of beer for the consumer have been increasing faster than the rate of inflation (which in itself helps stoke inflation), and faster than the supplier price charged by the brewers, it is not clear what margin is being made by the pubco and what margin by the pub lessee. We would contend that the balance of advantage in the split of profit margins lies with the pubcos, i.e. there has been a demonstrable shift in market power to the pubcos.

**Figure 6 – Price Indexes of Producer Price of Beer; Retail Index of Beer compared to RPI inflation.**

Year (Jan)	Producers Price Index <sup>13</sup> For Beer	% Rise on Previous Year	Retail Beer Price Index On Sales (Jan) <sup>14</sup>	% Rise on Previous Year	RPI Prices Index (Jan) <sup>15</sup>	% Rise on Previous Year
1997	98.8	0.2%	185.3	n/a	154.4	2.8
1998	103.1	4.2%	193.7	4.3%	159.5	3.3
1999	105.3	2.2%	202.4	4.3%	163.4	2.4
2000	103.6	-1.6%	206.4	1.9%	166.6	2
2001	108.3	4.3%	212.1	3.7%	171.1	2.7
2002	110.8	2.3%	218.1	3.8%	173.3	1.3
2003	112.1	1.2%	224.3	2.8%	178.4	2.9

6.2 The producers price index for beer is inclusive of excise and in theory reflects actual wholesale prices, however the increase in discounts means that particularly in the early 1990's actual wholesale prices did not rise as steeply as indicated by the index. Figure 7 below clearly depicts that even given this the retail price of beer has increased at a faster rate than the producer price of beer.


6.3 Between January 1997 and January 2003 the producer price of beer increased by 11.9%, which was below the rate of inflation of 13.5%. The retail price of beer however increased above the rate on inflation, increasing by 17.4%. This suggests that while pubcos have been enjoying real terms **reduction** in the price paid to brewers; the prices charged by pubcos to their tenants has been **increased**.

<sup>13</sup> National Statistics UK Producer Price Index – BBPA Statistical Handbook 2003, p.43.

<sup>14</sup> National Statistics UK Retail Prices Indices (On Sales). P.45

<sup>15</sup> National Statistics – Economic trends – Annual Supplement. (National statistics, London, 2003) p154.155.

**Figure 7 – Increase in Prices January 1997 - 2003**



- 6.4 Between 1997 and 2003 the retail price of beer has **increased at 22.4%** against the rate of inflation, despite a real terms **decrease of 13.4** in the producer price of beer against the rate of inflation. This disparity is a result of the increase in the margins pubcos have taken from the sale of beer to their tied tenants. The absence of competition as a result of the tie has allowed pubcos to increase their margins on beer sales at the expense of tenants and ultimately the consumer.
- 6.5 Excise duty is often wrongly blamed for the above inflation increase in the retail price of beer. Between 1997 and 2003 excise duty increased by 12.1%, which was just below the rate of inflation of 13.5%.
- 6.6 The monopolistic position of pubcos in the supply of beer to their tenants is leading to above inflation increases in the retail price of beer. This is having the following negative impacts:
- Fuelling a shift of beer consumption from the on trade to the off trade as consumers are deterred by high prices. In 1989 81% of beer was consumed in pubs compared to only 63.3% in 2002.<sup>16</sup>
  - Fuelling the decline of the market share of beer compared to other alcoholic drinks. In 1989 beer accounted to 56.7% of alcohol consumed in Britain. This figure had fallen to 46.4% in 2002.
  - An increase in the retail price of beer above the rate of inflation impacting on consumers.
  - Undermining the viability of smaller community orientated pubs.
- 6.7 To stop pubcos from abusing their market power to benefit from ever increasing margins on beer sold to tied tenants as a result of their monopolistic position we propose that:
- **The annual increase in pubco's' list prices must not exceed whichever is the higher of the annual increase in the producer price index or the RPI.**

<sup>16</sup> BBPA – 2003 Statistical Handbook. P.20.

## 7.0 Rents

7.1 We are concerned by the continued increase in rents faced by tenants when there are a number of reasons why rents should be falling. Falling beer sales and a shift to consumption at home<sup>17</sup> reflect tougher trading circumstances, which should logically be reflected in reduced dry rents. But, the existence of inflexible contracts specifying annual RPI increases or upward only rent clauses mean that even where trade is falling rents continue to increase.

7.2 Given that the producer price of beer has fallen in real times while the prices paid by tenants for their beer has increased then in an equitable relationship this would be reflected by a pound for pound reduction in rent. It has not. We believe that the ability of pubcos to negotiate huge discounts in the price they pay for beer should be clearly reflected in rent reviews.

7.3 There needs to be a review of the two main methods used by the industry to calculate rents. Using turnover to determine rent (turnover method) is potentially damaging as premises with identical turnover can have vastly different profits. The other method of basing rents on those paid by comparable pubs is in our view open to abuse. Our concern is that these two methods can lead to unsustainable rents, which will lead to:

- Rapid turnover in tenants as new tenants quickly realise the pub is not viable.
- Lack on investment in the premises.
- Increased possibility of closure.

7.4 In an attempt to ensure rents more accurately reflect the profitability of a business we suggest that:

- **Annual RPI increases and upward only rent reviews should be stopped.**
- **Tenants should have the right to have disputes settled by court, notwithstanding a provision for arbitration.**

---

<sup>17</sup> Refer to 6.6

## 8.0 A Code of Conduct

- 8.1 We support the retention of the “Tie”. The brewer’s “Tie” is justified because it is essential to the survival of small and medium sized brewers and enables them to maintain a distribution network. The loss of the tie for small and medium sized brewers would lead to brewery closures and therefore reduce competition and consumer choice.
- 8.2 We also support the retention of the beer “Tie” for pubcos as long as the net cost of the tie is not to the financial detriment of the tenant or the consumer. Whether the tie as currently operated by many pubcos is really to the benefit of tenants is open to question.
- 8.3 A key benefit of the beer “Tie” should be that the tenant receives proper levels of support from their pubco. Unfortunately many pubcos conspicuously fail to provide this support as shown by the comments below from individual licensees. These comments are taken from the Publican newspaper’s website.
- 8.4 A recent survey conducted by the Publican Newspaper revealed that over 70 per cent of licensees think the beer tie is weighed in favour of the landlord. The results are based on a poll of over 350 licensees on thePublican.com. Below are comments posted by two former tenants on the publican website<sup>18</sup>:
- “We just had to leave our pub, in debt, after almost 5 years of hard slog getting nowhere, due in significant part, to the crippling nature of the pubco-tenant relationship. It was certainly not due to lack of commitment or effort on our part.” **Former tenant.**
  - I was tied to many things as an Enterprise tenant, we all know about the extortionate prices for beer etc., and the cost of cellar maintenance, but what about the tie on building insurance? I now find myself paying per year for insurance what I paid Enterprise per month.” **Former tenant.**
- 8.5.1 A number of pubco bosses have spoken out against the unfair relationship between pub tenant and some pubcos:
- “The real issue that the Government should consider is the mechanism for beer price rises in long-term pubco lease agreements. In fact the owner can put up the price of beer in a manner which is beyond the control of the tenant and this effect can be very damaging over the long term.” **Tim Martin, Wetherspoons**<sup>19</sup>
  - “A lot of lessees feel they are being screwed over, that when times get tough there is no relationship. When do lessors ever sit down with lessees and say, well times are bad, here’s a brief break or reduction in the rent level?” **Peter Linacre, managing director of Massive Pubco**<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> www.thepublican.com

<sup>19</sup> Letters – Morning Advertiser newspaper - 20<sup>th</sup> May 2004

<sup>20</sup> Pubco bosses attack tough operators – Publican newspaper, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2003

- “The lease is not a partnership. Tenants are virtually penalised in their rent reviews and it is the company that benefits from an increase in barrelage in a pub, not the tenant.” **Peter Salussolia, chief executive of Glendola Leisure pubco**<sup>21</sup>
- 8.6 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that many pubcos are more interested in maximising short-term profits rather than building a long-term partnership with tenants. The decision in May 2003 by Punch Taverns to reduce its business development managers from 90 to 70 despite an increasing number of pub tenants is an illustration of the lack of client focus and investment in assisting tenants to secure long term business growth.
- 8.7 Pubcos have been criticised by London police chief London Borough Commander Dick Quinn for failing to offer proper support to their tenants. He said “the licensees in these pubs were under a lot of pressure ..... The company must take more responsibility because these pubs have a massive effect on the surrounding community”.<sup>22</sup> His comments follow a series of shootings linked to pubs in Lambeth.
- 8.8 Lack of support for pubco tenants undermines the whole purpose of the tie’s existence. It also contributes to a high turnover of pub tenants and poorly run pubs. In order to ensure that pubcos actually fulfil their responsibilities to tenants to provide them with proper support CAMRA proposes that:
- **A legally binding code of conduct setting out the obligations and duties of pubcos to their tenants.** Such a code of conduct should ensure that tenants are offered an appropriate level of support and should encourage pubcos and tenants to work together in partnership.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> The Publican Newspaper – 13<sup>th</sup> May 2004

## **9.0 Consolidation of ownership**

- 9.1 The consolidation of pub ownership and the emergence of ever larger pubcos acts to exacerbate problems inherent in the tenant pubco relationship. As pubcos grow larger so does the impact of anti competitive practices on the market as a whole
- 9.2 Enterprise Inns currently own 14.7% and Punch Taverns 12.3% of the UK's pub stock. Given the existence of the beer tie we believe that these concentrations of ownership undermine competition and choice.
- 9.3 In order to gain access to the pubco estates brewers are forced to offer huge discounts not on offer to the rest of the market. The larger the pubco the greater its power to squeeze greater discounts from brewers. The increasing prevalence of discounting is allowing the large national brewers to block access to the market to smaller brewers unable to deliver the same economies of scale or to cross subsidise sales.
- 9.4 To prevent the strengthening of the complex monopoly created by the pubcos we propose that:
  - **The OFT remains vigilant of pubco mergers and takeovers.**

## 10.0 Conclusion

### *The Beer Tie*

10.1 CAMRA supports the continuation of the “Tie”, as we believe that it can work in the interests of consumers, pubcos and brewers. At present however the market power of the pubcos means that the “Tie” works to the benefit of pubcos and against the interests of brewers and consumers. The beer tie has allowed pubcos to establish a complex monopoly in the supply of beer, which is undermining competition, restricting consumer choice and leading to excessive retail price increases. The tie is in clear need of reform hence our proposals for:

- **The introduction of a guest beer right for all pubco tenants and lessees.**
- **Pubcos are obliged to offer every prospective tenant the option of a free of tie tenancy at a competitive rent.**

### *Beer Prices*

10.2 The retail price of beer has consistently increased at a faster rate than both the rate of inflation and the producer price of beer. This increase has been a direct result of the market power exercised by pubcos at the wholesale level of trade. The prices paid to brewers by pubcos have decreased in real terms while the prices charged to tenants have increased. The increase in the profit margins pubcos have earned on beer sold to tenants has not been reflected in reduced rents.

In order to protect pub tenants and ultimately consumers from excessive price rises in the future we suggest that:

- **The annual increase in pubcos list prices must not exceed whichever is the higher of the annual increase in the producer price index or the RPI.**

### *Rents*

10.3 The setting of unsustainable rents threatens the future of public houses by ensuring a rapid turnover in tenants as a result of consecutive business failures. The relationship between pubco and tenant should ideally be one of partnership and this should be reflected in the setting of rents. We therefore propose that:

- **Annual RPI increases and upward only rent reviews should be stopped.**
- **Tenants should have the right to have disputes settled by court, notwithstanding a provision for arbitration.**

### *Code of Conduct*

10.4 Pubcos are failing in their obligations to provide proper support and advice services for their tenants. This failure is resulting in increased business failures and a hostile relationship between tenants and pubcos who believe that the relationship is one sided. We therefore propose:

- **A legally binding code of conduct setting out the obligations and duties of pubcos to their tenants.**

### *Consolidation of ownership*

10.5 The emergence of ever larger pubcos increases the impact of anti-competitive practices. We therefore propose:

- **The OFT remains vigilant of pubco mergers and takeovers.**

*The Campaign for Real Ale  
May 2004*

### *Contact Details*

Mike Benner, Jonathan Mail, Iain Loe

01727 867201

CAMRA Ltd  
230 Hatfield Rd  
St Albans  
AL1 4LW  
Tel: 01727 867201  
Fax: 01727 867670  
E.mail: [jonathan.mail@camra.org.uk](mailto:jonathan.mail@camra.org.uk)

CAMRA Home Page: <http://www.camra.org.uk>

## **Appendix 1**

### *About CAMRA*

CAMRA, The Campaign for Real Ale is a not-for-profit independent voluntary consumer body which exists to promote and defend access to full-flavoured and distinctive beer and the best features of the British pub.

CAMRA was founded in 1971 and membership our membership currently exceeds 72,000.

CAMRA's mission is to act as the champion of the consumer in relation to the UK and European drinks industry. Its aims are as follows:

**Maintain consumer rights**

**Promote quality, choice and value for money**

**Support the public house as a focus of community life**

**And campaign for greater appreciation of traditional beers, ciders and perries  
as part of national heritage and culture**

**The Campaign is funded by member subscriptions, sales of publications and products and proceeds from beer festivals. Other than revenue from advertising in our member's newspaper, it is not funded in any way by the industry. Only individuals can join CAMRA.**